The financial entanglements of Canada's Prime Minister

Background

A career built at the intersection of finance and policy

Mark Carney's career is not a secret. It's the reason the conflicts matter. He has held senior positions at every level where global financial policy is shaped — and then he became Prime Minister.

This is not a political attack on a career in finance. This is a factual record showing that the person now making Canadian policy on energy, infrastructure, climate, and international investment spent the preceding five years leading investment in exactly those sectors for a firm that profits from exactly those policies.

The ethics screen

103 conflicts, a blind trust that isn't blind, and a screen that misses 95%

On July 11, 2025, the Ethics Commissioner published Carney's conflict-of-interest screen, revealing that 103 corporate entities are covered — including Brookfield Asset Management, Brookfield Corporation, Stripe Inc., and companies owned or controlled by them. Nearly 60 of the 103 entities are Brookfield-related. Carney divided the screen into three categories: companies where he had a management role, Brookfield portfolio companies in the Registry of Lobbyists, and entities screened "out of an abundance of caution."

The screen is administered by Marc-André Blanchard, Carney's chief of staff, and Privy Council Clerk Michael Sabia — both of whom serve at the PM's pleasure. A PMO spokesperson stated Carney worked with the Ethics Commissioner to "exceed" the ethics rules by creating a blind trust before being sworn in.

The 95% gap

The House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI) — in its own Committee Report No. 4 — found that 95% of Brookfield's portfolio companies are not subject to the Prime Minister's conflict-of-interest screen. The screen checks 103 named companies. Brookfield's portfolio numbers in the thousands. The PM's financial incentive, however, moves with the entire fund — not just the 103 names on the list.

The same ETHI report states that the screen administrators — Blanchard and Sabia — did not have knowledge of the specific assets constituting the BGTF from which the PM is set to draw future compensation. The people running the screen couldn't see what was inside the fund they were supposed to screen for.

The 99% loophole

Under the Conflict of Interest Act (Section 4), conflict is defined as exercising an official power that provides an opportunity to further private interests. But the Act only prevents participation in decisions that specifically target screened entities. As long as a decision applies generally or affects a broad class, the PM is free to participate — even if it directly benefits his investments.

As Democracy Watch testified: the Act allows the Prime Minister to participate in "99% of the decisions" that impact his private investments. Every clean energy tax credit, every infrastructure incentive, every regulatory fast-track — these are "general" policy decisions that pour billions into sectors where the PM's financial interests sit. The screen doesn't cover them.

This is the unit-of-control mismatch: the screen controls for company-specific conflicts, but the PM's financial incentive is sensitive to sector-wide outcomes. Carbon pricing, energy regulation, infrastructure spending — all of these affect BGTF returns without triggering the company-specific screen.

CBC reported committee testimony revealing the screen was raised in 13 instances, found inapplicable in 7, and applied in 6 cases. But the screen hides the fact that the PM is not recusing himself from the vast majority of decisions affecting his investments. Subsection 25(1) of the Act requires public declaration of recusal — but ethics screens were created specifically to allow office holders to circumvent that requirement.

Sources: ETHI Committee Report No. 4 · ETHI Evidence No. 16 (103 screened entities) · OCIEC Annex A — Screened Entity List · OCIEC Appendix — Summary Statement · Conflict of Interest Act, Section 4 · Democracy Watch · Global News, Jul. 14, 2025 · CBC News, Jul. 11, 2025 · CBC News, Nov. 19–20, 2025

Fund exposure

$35 billion in transition funds — with a named incentive plan

As Head of Transition Investing at Brookfield, Carney oversaw the creation and marketing of two massive investment funds focused on clean energy, infrastructure, and the global energy transition:

What the official record says

The Ethics Commissioner's own public registry identifies, among the items placed in Carney's blind trust: options and deferred share units in Brookfield Corporation, options and deferred share units in Brookfield Asset Management, and a "Notional Long Term Incentive Plan in the Brookfield Global Transition Fund." This is not inference or media reporting — it is the named instrument in the Commissioner's filing.

The OCIEC's Annex A — the screened entity list — confirms that BGTF I is on the screen. But this is where the screen's limitation becomes clear: the fund itself is screened, but the fund's returns are driven by the performance of its entire portfolio. And ETHI's Committee Report No. 4 found that 95% of Brookfield's portfolio companies fall outside the screen.

The OCIEC defines controlled assets as assets whose value could be affected by government decisions or policy — including publicly traded securities and stock options. A fund-linked incentive plan whose returns move with sector-wide policy conditions (carbon pricing, energy subsidies, infrastructure spending) is the definition of an asset affected by government decisions.

For context, Brookfield Corporation has reported an annualized return of 18% over 30 years to its shareholders. If the PM retains any incentive eligibility linked to BGTF I and II — $35 billion in combined fund assets generating these kinds of returns — the personal upside is measured in the "tens of millions" that Parliament's committee described.

Sources: ETHI Committee Report No. 4 · OCIEC Appendix — Summary Statement (blind trust items) · OCIEC Annex A — Screened Entity List · OCIEC — Controlled Assets and Divestment Guidance · Brookfield Corporation Q1 2025 Letter to Shareholders

The network

Where Carney's worlds overlap

Carney didn't just work in finance and policy separately — he held simultaneous roles across both, building a network that spans global institutions, private investment, and Canadian government:

The bottom line

This is not about whether Mark Carney is personally corrupt. This is about whether any democracy can function when its head of government has financial interests of this scale, this complexity, and this much overlap with the policy decisions they control — and when the only safeguard is a screening process administered by their own appointees.

The answer is no. And the remedy is simple: divest.